Starshell

‘A little light on what’s going on!’

Volume VII, No. 65  ~  Winter 2013-14

100 years of submarines in the RCN!

National Magazine of The Naval Association of Canada
Magazine nationale de L’Association Navale du Canada

www.navalassoc.ca
Starshell Magazine
issn 1191-1166
National magazine of The Naval Association of Canada
Magazine nationale de L'Association Navale du Canada
www.navalassoc.ca

OUR COVER
RCN SUBMARINE CENTENNIAL

The two RCN H-Class submarines CH14 and CH15 dressed overall, ca. 1920-22. Built in the US, they were offered to the RCN by the Admiralty as they were surplus to British needs. See: “100 Years of Submarines in the RCN” beginning on page 4.

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Starshell is printed in Canada by Postlink Corporation, Ottawa

Editorial services, layout and design are provided by...

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Phone 250-314-1284 • Fax 250-314-1286
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Starshell Magazine is published quarterly by The Naval Association of Canada (NAC) in February, May, August and November. The editor is solely responsible for the selection of material. Contributions are encouraged and should be sent direct to the editor. PLEASE NOTE: ALL MATERIAL MUST REACH THE EDITOR NO LATER THAN THE 15TH DAY OF THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE MONTH OF PUBLICATION. All photographs submitted for publication must be accompanied by suitable captions and accreditation. CHANGES OF ADDRESS ARE TO BE SENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NOT THE EDITOR.

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Except for headline making events such as the tragic accident aboard HMCS Chicoutimi in 2004, the debate over the proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines in 1987-88 or the recent problems associated with returning the Victoria-class to operational status, Canadians tend to be unaware that Canada even possesses, or has much involvement with submarines. There is even less awareness of the chequered history of submarines in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) or of the men who served in them — a history that will celebrate its Centennial in 2014.

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the miniscule RCN, then just four years old, had only the old cruiser HMCS Rainbow based in Esquimalt for defence of the coastal waters of British Columbia. The Premier of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, was extremely concerned over the lack of naval forces to protect BC waters in the event that the German squadron of Admiral Graf von Spee approached the coast; a concern heightened when Rainbow sailed quietly on 3 August to meet the potential threat of the German cruiser Leipzig then off Mexico and apparently heading north.

McBride acted upon his concern and on his own initiative. He had learned that the Seattle Dry Dock and Construction Company had two submarines available for sale. Iquique and Antofagasta had been built for the Chilean Navy but the Chileans refused to accept them since there were significant unspecified deficiencies.

After three days of negotiating back and forth between Seattle, Ottawa and Victoria, in the middle of the night of 4-5 August 1914, the submarines slipped out of the yard under cover of darkness. After an inspection by Canadian authorities in Canadian waters off Esquimalt, a cheque for $1.2 million was handed over in exchange for possession of the submarines in the early morning of 5 August. The following day the Canadian government ratified the purchase and commissioned the vessels in the RCN as HMC Ships CC1 and CC2.

Their crews were drawn from volunteers from the Royal Navy Canadian Volunteer Reserve (RNCVR) and the tiny squadron was commanded by a retired British submariner living in Canada who was brought into the RCN. The addition of some technical personnel from the cruiser Rainbow meant there was a nucleus of naval trained personnel. Initially none had any submarine experience so training for virtually all hands was necessary.

The submarines were placed at the disposal of the British Admiralty since, at the time, the fledgling RCN was fully under the operational control of the Royal Navy (RN), which decided that they should remain in BC waters for training purposes. There they stayed until the summer of 1917 when they were ordered to Halifax, NS, together with their depot ship HMCS Shearwater. Thus they became the first ships to transit the Panama Canal flying the White Ensign. They languished in Halifax until 1920 when they were sold for scrap.

Although some twelve Canadian naval officers served in submarines during World War I, two in particular served with distinction. B. L. ‘Barney’ Johnson was a master mariner and a marine pilot with the Vancouver Pilotage Authority who was temporarily attached to the RCN in Esquimalt. The temporary attachment became permanent for the duration...
of the war. He was commissioned as an Acting Lieutenant in the Reserve and appointed as second-in-command of CC2. Subsequently, he was appointed to command one of the submarines building for the RN in Montréal. He commissioned H8 in 1915 and took her across the Atlantic to Britain. He became the first Canadian to command a submarine and he later won the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for his exploits in command of the submarine in the North Sea.

Unlike Johnson, William Maitland-Dougall was a regular force officer. He had entered the Royal Naval College of Canada in 1911 at the age of fifteen as a member of the first term of cadets at the new College. After graduation in 1913, he had been in a British cruiser until recalled to Canada at the outbreak of war to serve in the newly acquired submarines. In 1915 he volunteered to serve in British submarines and underwent further training in Britain. After serving as second-in-command to Lt Barney Johnson in HMS D3, he qualified for submarine command and replaced Johnson in D3. Thus he became the youngest to command a submarine and the first RCN (Regular Force) officer to do so. Maitland-Dougall was killed, just before his twenty-third birthday, on 12 March 1918 when his submarine was attacked and sunk while on the surface by a French airship in a tragic case of mistaken identity.

At the end of World War I, two H-class submarines that had been built in the United States were offered to the RCN by the Admiralty as they were surplus to British needs. This was a gift the Canadians did not want as they could not afford to run both submarines and do the necessary training for the surface ships. In addition there were not enough sailors to man everything. Nevertheless, under pressure from the Admiralty, the RCN reluctantly took the two submarines, designating them CH14 and CH15. Although some effort was made to keep the submarines operational, they were laid up permanently in June 1922 after the government refused to approve the annual upkeep costs necessary. There would be a hiatus of 23 years before submarines returned to RCN service.

Canada did not acquire any submarines during WWII although at one point in mid-1943, there was a proposal to form a submarine branch of the RCN and acquire six submarines. The Naval Board ultimately rejected this proposal. Submarines did serve in Canada to train the RN. Twenty-six officers, all from the RCNVR, underwent submarine training during the years 1942-1944. Of these, three went on to command British submarines. Two were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) with LCDr Freddie Sherwood from Ottawa earning a second award for actions in the Far East. One officer who had volunteered for ‘chariot’ (human torpedoes) operations was killed in January 1943 when the submarine in which he was taking passage enroute to his target was sunk.

In 1945, the RCN took over two surrendered German U-boats: U-889 and U-190. The former was transferred to the USN early in 1946 after supporting equipment trials by the RCN. U-190 lasted until October 1947 when due to her deteriorating state, she was sunk as a target off Halifax near the spot where she had torpedoed HMCS Esquimalt in April 1945. This time the hiatus would only last 15 years.

The postwar RCN evolved into a highly specialized ASW Navy. Effective operational training for the navy, and the maritime patrol aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), required the services of submarines. The RN provided such services for the RCN and RCAF on the east coast after the war using the small U-class. For a variety of reasons, including cost, this arrangement was ultimately unsatisfactory for both parties.

In the early 1950s, negotiations began between the RN and the RCN for what became a complex agreement by which the RN stationed a squadron of three submarines in Halifax. In return, the RCN provided personnel for training and subsequent service in British submarines—not necessarily those stationed in Halifax.

In the summer of 1955 the first submarine arrived to inaugurate the Squadron.
This arrangement lasted for ten years and came to a close when HMCS Ojibwa arrived in Halifax in 1965.

On the Pacific coast there was no similar arrangement. However, there was a good relationship with the USN and the west coast ships and aircraft frequently exercised with submarines of the USN. While this was a beneficial situation, the amount of training time available to the RCN and RCAF in the Pacific was extremely limited and insufficient to sustain high standards of operational readiness in ASW.

Throughout much of the 1950s, the RCN considered the acquisition of submarines of its own — including a study of the option of obtaining nuclear-powered submarines. The cost of the arrangement on the east coast was increasing and Britain was anxious to reduce its commitment. In 1960 the government authorized the lease of the former USS Burrfish, a World War II era USN boat in the reserve fleet, for a five year period of service on the west coast. Renamed HMCS Grilse, she was commissioned into the RCN on May 11, 1961. This decision resulted in two training streams — one USN and one RN. This would have some interesting repercussions over terminology and operating philosophies when the two groups merged during the introduction of the Oberons.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the navy had plans for a small force of six modern submarines, based on the USN Barbel design, which would have both an operational and a training function. Grilse was viewed as a stop gap measure. However, politics got in the way of these plans during the major shake-up of National Defence initiated by Paul Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence.

Instead of the planned six, US-designed, ‘state of the art’ diesel boats, the government entered into negotiations with the Admiralty for the acquisition of three submarines to be built in Britain. These were the Oberon-class which, although very advanced in some features, was essentially an update of the World War II Type XXI U-boat design. The US design used the advanced ‘tear drop’ hull form utilized by the USN for its nuclear attack submarines which gave the diesel electric Barbel much better speed and diving capability than that of the Oberon-class. The Oberon was considerably cheaper however.

The first of the new submarines was commissioned as HMCS Ojibwa at Chatham Dockyard in the summer of 1965. She had been laid down for the RN as HMS Onyx but was transferred to the RCN while under construction. She was followed in 1967 by HMCS Onondaga and in 1968 by HMCS Okanagan. Onondaga and Okanagan incorporated a series of modifications to meet specific RCN requirements. A fourth Oberon, to meet the west coast requirement, was vaguely promised but in the event was never authorized.

The government was at pains to point out that the acquisition of these submarines was for the purposes of training the ASW forces of the RCN and the RCAF — exclusively on the east coast. They were not to have any operational role. This despite the fact that the thinking within NATO ASW circles was that the best anti-submarine vehicle was another submarine. The Oberons did the same ‘clockwork mouse’ evolutions for the surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft that their RN predecessors had done from 1955 to 1965. They spent a considerable amount of time at sea — much more than their surface ship cousins.

By the late 1970s, the Oberons were getting tired. Most of their sensor systems were obsolete and spare parts were becoming scarce and expensive. The Navy made a successful case for an update program, the formal title of which included the term ‘Operational.’ In addition to improvements in the submarines’ systems, new and modern electronics replaced the outdated analog versions and a new torpedo, the American Mark 48, was acquired. The update took place between 1980 and 1986 and the result was a very capable submarine. Given this better capability, the Navy finally assigned operational tasks, other than simply training, to the submarines — albeit reluctantly at the outset. The submarines proved their worth in several successful deployments in Cold War scenarios.

On the west coast the lease of Grilse had been extended for a further five years and she had been refitted in 1967. However, in 1968 the US Navy offered another submarine and the RCN bought the former USS Argonaut. She was commissioned as HMCS Rainbow and replaced Grilse which was returned to the USN in 1969. Rainbow only lasted until 1974 and for many years afterwards there would be no submarine based on the west coast. Occasional deployments of an Oberon from the east coast in the later 1980s alleviated the shortfall but did not solve it.

Although the modernization program for the Oberons was in progress in 1980, the Navy began the initial planning process for their eventual replacement with a modern diesel-electric submarine. This was a prudent move given the reality of very long lead times for such major projects. In 1983, a formal project was estab-
lished with a small team of dedicated personnel and the formal title established as the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Project — CASAP for short. This action took advantage of an offer from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), which also operated Oberon-class submarines, to participate in their replacement project which was at a more advanced stage. In the event, the cooperation with the RAN did not bear fruit (except for the Canadian team gaining much useful technical information) and each of the navies resumed their own courses of action.

In the mid-1980s, the newly elected federal government of Prime Minister Mulroney decided that the submarine replacement program should include nuclear-powered submarines. They were included in the 1987 Defence White Paper in support of a three ocean policy. To say that this was a controversial move is a gross understatement. Two years later the program was effectively cancelled when the funding was removed from the federal budget.

The impact of this diversion of focus from the core element of CASAP — the replacement of the Oberons with new diesel-electric submarines — was devastating. In effect the project went back to basics and a very low priority on the procurement ladder.

In 1998 an arrangement between the British and Canadian governments resulted in the acquisition by Canada of four diesel-electric submarines that were surplus to British requirements. Britain had opted to operate only nuclear-powered submarines and these four relatively new submarines had been laid up in a state of preservation (‘mothballed’) since 1994. They were the only four built out of a planned nine Upholder-class that had entered service between 1990 and 1993. Designated as the Victoria-class by the Canadian Navy, the namesake of the class was commissioned at Halifax in December 2000. She was followed by HMCS Windsor in June 2003, HMCS Corner Brook in March 2003 and HMCS Chicoutimi in September 2004. The latter submarine suffered a major fire en route across the Atlantic to Halifax. One officer, Lt(N) Chris Saunders, died as a result of smoke inhalation while fighting this fire. He became the second peacetime casualty in submarines.3

Arguably, the Victoria-class has given the Navy a better capability than it had with the Oberons. The west coast has a submarine capability of its own again and the submarines have an excellent operational ability that is being used. The era of nothing but ‘clockwork mice’ tasks seems over.

With the arrival of the Victoria-class the era of the Oberons ended. However, two have been preserved as museum ships. Onondaga was the first true Canadian boat and had commissioned in the Centennial Year of 1967, so it is fitting that she is preserved. After unsuccessful attempts to bring her to the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa, in 2008 she was relocated to the Pointe au Père Historic Site near Rimouski, Québec. She has been restored to a pristine condition and has become a major tourist attraction. Ojibwa, the first Canadian Oberon to commission, has also been rescued from the ship-breaker’s hands and is now high and dry as a museum submarine on the shores of Lake Erie in Port Burwell, Ontario. Her passage through the Seaway and the Welland canal on a barge in 2012 generated much positive publicity. She is now open to the public as part of the Elgin Military Museum in nearby St. Thomas, Ontario.

Footnotes

1 10 H-Class submarines were built at Canadian Vickers in Montréal in early 1915 for the RN, initially without the knowledge of the Canadian government. Five more were built in Vancouver and shipped to Russia in kit form. A further six, also built in Vancouver, never reached Russia and eventually ended up in USN service. See: http://www.gwpda.org/naval/cdnhboat.htm

2 Lt C. E. Bonnell, DSC, RCNVR in HMS P311.

3 The first was PO2 Verne McLeod killed when a HTP torpedo exploded in HMS Sidon in Portland, England on 16 June 1955.

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Submarines are perhaps the most misunderstood weapon system in the Canadian Forces. Few Canadians, even those well versed in military matters, understand their role in Canada’s defence. Worse, the technical issues that have afflicted the Victoria-class submarines have dominated the media narrative for a decade, convincing many that they really are a set of lemons put upon us by the crafty British. In actuality, the navy had relatively few options to replace its aging Oberons in the 1990s. It was the decisions made then, rather than any inherent technical shortcomings, which created many of the problems since experienced in the activation of these vessels. Yet, the choices for the navy were stark. Faced with a government that was essentially hostile to the idea of submarines, and limited in what it could spend, the used, but highly modern Upholders were the only option open to the RCN: it was either that or the end of the Submarine Service.

Submarines have long been controversial in Canada. The navy has spent most of its existence without having any. Two were acquired during World War One, but the service divested itself of them following the end of the war. Although many Canadians served in British submarines during World War Two, none were procured for the conflict and the government resisted the navy’s demands until the early 1960s. The navy was able then to convince the government at that time that its growing role in the field of anti-submarine warfare for NATO’s maritime defences required the acquisition of submarines in order to provide training targets. Two old American surplus WWII era submarines were leased and shortly thereafter new Oberon-class submarines were purchased from Britain. These submarines largely worked as ‘clockwork mice’ during naval exercises; however in the late 1980s modern combat systems and the Mk. 48 torpedoes were acquired for the boats making them operational weapons for the first time.

Little known is that the navy had been lobbying for submarines since the 1950s, and what it really wanted were nuclear submarines, not conventional ones like the Oberons. However, as the historian of the Canadian submarine programme points out, there was real concern with the nature of the operating system: the cost of an SSN was so steep, it made no sense to acquire them simply for training purposes.

With the addition of the large torpedoes, the subs became the most potent weapon system operated by the Canadian Armed Forces. A single shot from a Mk. 48 is capable of completely destroying all but the largest of vessels. As the Falklands War vividly demonstrated, such an action could compel real strategic action on the part of adversaries. After the sinking of the General Belgrano, the Argentinean navy retired from the field and left the island bound garrison of troops to their ultimate fate.

What many do not realize, the Argentinians almost pulled off the same feat against the British. Their submarine, the San Luis, achieved a fire solution on HMS Hermes, but the torpedoes failed to hit the ship because of a very simple technical error (its gyroscopes malfunctioned because an electrical cable had been misinstalled, reversing the polarity of the connection). Had Hermes been hit, the Royal Navy would have been forced to retire, ending Britain’s efforts to take back its colony. British naval forces knew that an Argentinean submarine was pursuing them, but were unable to effectively target it in return. Local acoustic conditions rendered the British forces helpless: over 150 weapons, most of its ASW ordnance, were released with no hits scored. According to the Argentinean Captain of the San Luis: “There was no effective counter attack. I don’t think that they knew we were there until they heard our torpedoes running.” The implication is that every weapon expended in the British ASW effort was against a false target.

The mere threat of submarines causes a potent deterrent effect on navies. The publication of a “Notice of Intention” by the RCN during the Turbot Crisis of 1995 helped to de-escalate the threat of confrontation between the Canadian and Spanish navies.

The navy flirted with the idea of SSNs again during the 1980s, taking advantage of an offhand comment by then defence minister Erik Nielsen to make a renewed case for them. The end of the Cold War and a growing government deficit saved the navy from a programme that likely would have eaten the service alive during the cash strapped 1990s. Indeed, it was the lack of any extra revenue to procure submarines that ultimately led the navy into the predicaments with which it currently wrestles with the Victorias. While the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence in 1994 ultimately supported the idea of replacing the aging Oberons, it was only if they could be replaced within the navy’s existing budget. Based on that guidance, the lucky appearance of the Upholder subs on the market probably saved the Canadian submarine service from a lingering death.

The Upholders were designed as ultra-quiet conventional submarines meant to defend the so-called Greenland-UK (GIUK) gap through which Soviet SSNs and SSBNs would have to transit in
order to attack Western resupply convoys or to manoeuvre into their firing positions respectively. With the end of the Cold War, and dealing with its own deficit programmes, UK MOD decided to invest all its efforts in SSNs, and terminated the programme after just four had been built. The submarines were placed up for sale, but given that they were virtually the same submarine as the nuclear Trafalgar-class, and based on sensitive US technology, the MOD could not just sell them to any navy. From the very beginning, Canada was the preferred customer given its close relations with both the US and the UK. Indeed, two successive US Secretaries of Defense lobbied Canadian politicians to step up to the altar and accept the subs.

However, submarines were politically unpopular within the Chrétien government. The former foreign minister called them “un-Canadian” and Chrétien himself dithered on the decision. Sensing that the window was about to slam shut, the navy lobbied hard for their acquisition in what was called the deal of the century — four slightly used subs for $750 million. The old supply vessel HMCS Provider would be paid off early and planned refits for the O-boats foregone.

But the navy had to live within the tight limits that had been established by that $750M figure. As such, much of the spare parts the RN had warehoused for the submarines were not purchased, or some of the technical information concerning the engineering of the submarine’s systems acquired from VSEL (later BAE Systems). Further, a series of technical problems were discovered in the submarines as they began to be reactivated by the Royal Navy. Many of these were fixed before the boats were turned over to Canada, however, several expensive fixes remained when we acquired them. The heavy demands made on the navy at the beginning of the War on Terror in 2003, just as the submarines were arriving in Halifax, also limited the ability to move quickly in resolving these issues.

In many ways, the problems experienced by the subs represent an ‘own goal’ on the part of the navy.

The decisions that were made at the time in order to get the boats, were to come back to haunt the navy years later. The failure to acquire sufficient spares or establish supplier relationships for parts resulted in many of the significant delays in making the subs operational as the navy worked to create its own network of industrial relationships to manufacture the specialized equipment found on no other naval system. This, rather than the frequent argument that the subs were poorly constructed, is responsible for the delays in the programme. Yet, given the constraints under which the navy had to operate in the mid-1990s meant that there really were no other alterna-
atives if the service was to be preserved. From several different perspectives, despite the problems that came with the boats, it really was the deal of the century! No new system could be considered given the cost constraints, no other used system was likely to come along and the O-boats were nearly at the end of their operational lives.

That the navy was willing to rashly run such risks perversely shows the importance attached by the navy to preserving the service. Students of politics will be quick to point out that bureaucratic organizations seek to preserve both budget as well as mission, if not also increase them. However, the scale of the effort to protect the subs meant it had to be a navy-wide effort, rather than simply the selfish pursuit of interests by a (very) small part of the service. Still, the desire by the RCN to protect its sub-surface capabilities escapes many Canadians, including those with backgrounds in military affairs.

Michael Byers and Stewart Webb’s recent critique of the Victoria-class submarine programme ‘re-surfaces’ what are actually very old concerns about the strategic requirement for these weapon systems in the inventory of the RCN. Their opposition to submarines is based purely on tactical considerations surrounding the current strategic environment. A strategic consideration of submarines is focused, rather, on the options that the system gives the Canadian government in an unknowable future security environment.

Of course, the submarine has long had a sinister reputation stemming from both the major global conflicts of the twentieth century. The vessels themselves with their black hulls are visually menacing. The unrestricted submarine campaigns conducted by the German navy in both wars cemented in the public’s imagination the inherent ‘evil’ of the submarine. The sinking of vessels like the Lusitania on May 7th, 1915 with the loss of 1,201 persons, all of them civilian passengers and crew, framed the essential horror of this weapon. Later, the long Battle of the Atlantic with the steady loss of merchant mariners, in equally horrible circumstances, reinforced this image. In Western nations, it is often forgotten that similar horrors were suffered by German and Japanese sailors in the unrestricted submarine operations conducted by allied navies. Submariners have often embraced this reputation: on the return of HMS Conqueror following the end of the Falklands War in 1982, it flew the Jolly Roger on its periscope along with a broom to indicate a ‘clean sweep’ of all its targets, reviving a tradition from the First World War.

In what seems to be a recurring pattern, Canadian qualms over submarines were raised even before the close of the Cold War and the debate over the so-called peace dividend. In 1983, the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence in its report Canada’s Maritime Defence noted “[Submarines’] major disadvantage is that they are quintessentially weapons of war and would be able to contribute little to the accomplishment of the ancillary duties assigned to MARCOM in peacetime.” A decade later, the Canada 21 report argued:

\[
\text{In the new strategic context, there is no obvious need to maintain the wide range of air, ground and ASW conventional forces needed to repel an attack because it is difficult to conceive of any military power with the desire or ability to attack Canada.}
\]

On the then proposed Upholder purchase, the Globe and Mail editorialised “[e]ven if we could afford the $800 million [cabinet] knows that nothing is a bargain if they are not necessary.” Even some retired naval officers argued against the systems. Former submarine captain Ed Gigg wrote that:

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\text{Britain has every right to reap the so-called ‘peace dividend’ by taking Upholder submarines out of service; but Canada should not consider adding to the British dividend by purchasing submarines for which there is no demonstrable need,}
\]

and Captain ‘Tex’ Thomas argued that: “In time of changing focus for the fleet, increasing complications for funding and emphasis on versatility and flexibility, there is no justification for acquiring new submarines.” In sum, there is a long history of opposition to submarines in Canada.

The problem with these arguments is basically their tactical orientation to submarines as weapons. First, it is difficult for Canadians to imagine a replay of the Battle of the Atlantic emerging once more at sea. Secondly, it is impossible for them to imagine Canadian crews deliberately targeting foreign commercial shipping in the same way that contemporary Canadians condemn our participation in the strategic bombing campaigns against Germany during World War Two. Both of the above scenarios imagine how the vessels might be used in a specific circumstance, rather than considering the types of general options such a capability gives to a Canadian government.

We should consider, therefore, these options that open up to governments. Because of their inherent stealthiness they can:

- operate in a state’s backyard, unsupported and in the face of opposing sea control efforts;
- conduct non-politically intrusive operations in forward areas;
- be inserted for a wide range of operational tasks (intelligence indication and warning, special operations);
- conduct a wide range of operations with a high degree of survivability.

Submarines, thus, offer considerable strategic flexibility to the nations that operate them. Besides their ominous offensive capabilities, three roles fall naturally to submarines: Conventional Deterrence, Intelligence Collection and Operational Support.

◆ Strategic Conventional Deterrence

Submarines are enormously difficult to find at sea. In World War Two, the huge casualties suffered by the German wolf packs were partly caused by the speed of convoys that forced most submarines to attack on the surface where ships and aircraft could more easily attack them. How-
ever, modern submarines (particularly nuclear submarines) are much faster which gives them the tactical manoeuvrability to attack while submerged. As noted above, the Royal Navy found out in the Falklands War modern ASW is far more tricky.

Such operational difficulties exert a strong psychological effect on navies. Knowledge of an operational submarine in a particular area will often deter navies from entering at all. Following the sinking of the General Belgrano by Conquerer, the Argentinian navy returned to port. The knowledge that the Canadian navy had deployed submarines to the Georges Bank in 1995, assisted in managing the crisis between Spain and Canada during the Turbot War.

**Intelligence Collection**

The same features which enhance conventional deterrence also play an important role in intelligence collection. The ability to cruise undetected close to hostile shores demonstrates the utility of these vessels. During the height of the Cold War, American submarines were able to penetrate the ports of some of the Soviet Union’s most sensitive naval installations, conducting signals and electronic intelligence, as well as photographing the undersides of Soviet submarines.

Submarines would be able to perform similar missions in other operational contexts, complementing the intelligence resources available to a naval or a ground force commander. Further, such missions might be able to collect intelligence unavailable by other means.

Opposing forces can avoid or deceive satellite reconnaissance as long as the orbital periods are known. Long range high altitude aircraft, such as the U2 and Global Hawk UAV, are highly scarce resources which may not be available on short notice. Further, these and other aircraft may be detected, thereby warning the opposition that they are being watched. A submarine’s stealth avoids these problems. No other platform has the ability to covertly track, identify and monitor vessels in fog conditions. ‘Bottomed out’ submarines resting on the sea floor, can conduct long range and long term intelligence operations in strategic waterways with little likelihood of being detected. Canadian submarines have been used in such purposes to monitor American fishing vessels thought to be illegally harvesting fish in Canadian waters and have supported counter-drug efforts in the Caribbean.

**Operational Support**

Lastly, given the difficulty in finding and communicating with submerged submarines, they are rightly considered military weapon systems. However, in some circumstances they can provide powerful operational support to other military systems. Under good sonar conditions and equipped with a towed array, submarines are capable of covering 125,000 km² over a forty to fifty day patrol. Thus, considerable resource savings can be had with submarines, especially given that Canada’s Victoria-class submarines are crewed by only 48 sailors, whereas a similarly capable naval task group might have as many as 1,400, not to mention the considerable fuel costs of a five ship formation as compared to that of a single submarine.

Operating in conjunction with maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), submarines are able to assist in controlling enormous areas. Again, the sensors on board these vessels provide useful long range information; however, the submarine’s ability to respond to that information may be limited by speed and safety considerations.

Submarines operating with MPA (or even in the future, organically deployed UAVs) can pass on their target information, allowing the aircraft to conduct more detailed investigations of contacts that are far removed from the submarine’s position. This also has the benefit of allowing the submarine to remain covert.

Those arguing that submarines have no use in a Canadian context, thus, are thinking in very narrow terms about what types of threats they can imagine given the current political environment. They have difficulty imagining how the awesome capabilities characteristic to submarines would be employed by the Canadian government in future operations, and thus dismiss them as unnecessary. There is a fundamental problem of using such logic to determine Canadian naval requirements. Our military contributions to Canadian security, whether exercised in terms of domestic operations or those in alliance, coalition or UN operations, should be determined by our values and interests rather than the availability of specific military capabilities. Those who rely on the capability argument avoid the difficult question of what, as a country, we are willing to fight for.

Clearly, as the history since 1991 has shown, there are some things that even the most war averse government has deemed necessary to support with military force. What those issues will be in the future is entirely unknowable, just as it was impossible to imagine the high intensity operations conducted by the Canadian army in Kandahar province in 2006/7, or the bombing operations undertaken by the RCAF over Libya in 2010.

Submarines offer tremendous flexibility in how they can be used. While their acquisition costs are high, once acquired, their operations and maintenance costs can be quite low.

Presently, most Canadian cities enjoy historically low crime rates, yet the argument that police forces can be dramatically cut is justifiably risible. That we have not experienced a fire or other natural disaster is hardly an argument for abandoning home insurance. Airports have relatively few crashes but none go without their own fire trucks. So it is with military forces. We purchase military capabilities not with the expectation that they will be used, but with the hope that they will prove entirely unnecessary.

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Dr. Paul T. Mitchell is a Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College, an alumnus of Wilfrid Laurier University, and a Research Associate of the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies.

The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the Canadian Forces College or the Department of National Defence.
A lfred Thayer Mahan, the 19th century American geopolitical strategist, theorized that for a country to be a maritime nation it needed to have specific and unique characteristics, namely: to be either an island or like an island for ease of defense, to have a long coastline, access to seas from interior via rivers and bays, and have numerous and deep harbours, a portion of the population engaged in seagoing occupations or suited to them, a citizenry that has a strong leaning towards commerce and business, and a government faithful to the will of the people, that can provide intelligent direction, promote the growth and strength of seagoing commerce and build a strong navy.

The Prime Minister of Canada, on May 3, 2012, stated: “Canada is a maritime nation, a maritime nation with trade, commerce and interests around the world. Surrounded as we are by three oceans, it can truly be said that Canada and its economy float on salt water. Such a nation must have a navy. A navy that serves, a navy that protects, a navy that will, if circumstances demand, place its ships and their personnel in situations of imminent danger, for the sake of the country they have sworn to defend.”

The Prime Minister was speaking about a modern Canada in the context of Mahan. He was speaking of a Canada with unique characteristics. When the government initiated the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) they were following Mahan’s principle “…to build a strong navy.”

“The Harper government is committed to supporting Canadian jobs and industry by maximizing military procurement,” Minister Ambrose said recently as the government formally received a report prepared by a panel of experts chaired by Tom Jenkins, Special Adviser to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services.

Although not specifically about shipbuilding, the Jenkins Report, “Canada

First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities,” further supports the Mahanian principles by advising the government to develop a defence industrial strategy for Canada, to invest in Canada, which is what Mahan advocated in the USA.

The NSPS is that single Canadian defence-related policy and investment programme that has the potential to exploit our national characteristics as a maritime nation, as envisaged by Mahan, while investing in Canada for Canadians. The NSPS therefore is a modern nation-building policy as ambitious as the Trans Canada Highway or the St. Lawrence Seaway were in their day. Grasping the potential and the opportunity presented by the NSPS will require, in Mahan’s words: “…a citizenry that has a strong leaning towards commerce and business, and a government faithful to the will of the people, that can provide intelligent direction, promote growth and strength of sea-going commerce and builds a strong navy.”

Although the NSPS is still young, it is enlightening to compare the outcome of following Mahan’s principles between the USA and Canada. By following Mahan’s principles, the USA developed into an economically strong and prosperous maritime nation. For Canada, at least at this point in time, the fruits of our government’s maritime strategic initiative, the NSPS, notwithstanding recent minor contract announcements, seem to be theocratic hubris — increased government process with plenty of circular consultation, an apparently absolute aversion to risk, and indeed, no steel yet being cut for the navy or coast guard. Not quite the outcomes postulated by Mahan or envisioned by our government.

The tangible gem of this potentially great nation-building endeavour is the Canadian Surface Combatant 2 (CSC), worth more than $26B. That project alone has the potential to employ thousands of Canadians, to design, build and sustain these ships throughout their service to Canada. This will be the single biggest shipbuilding investment in Canada, short of wartime efforts. It is, perhaps, what the Prime Minister envisioned when he spoke of our nation understanding the value of our oceans, the necessity of ensuring the freedom of the seas, and the necessity of building and sustaining our fleet while building the high quality national industrial base to sustain the effort beyond what was considered in the NSPS. Sadly, we must remember Canada’s current reality: theocratic hubris, process and risk aversion!

It is disappointing that pundits who have commented on the NSPS and the Jenkins Report have not grasped the fundamental strategic underpinnings of these initiatives and as a result seem to have embraced, perhaps unwittingly, what appears to be a subservient colonial mindset, one that questions Canada and Canadian’s ability to succeed. This mindset coupled
with the Canadian reality of theocratic hubris, increased process and risk aversion creates an environment that is counter to the principles laid out by Mahan. Recall he advocated building a national capability not relying on foreign solutions as he recognized that buying offshore ultimately results in a loss of sovereignty, a loss of wealth, and forces a reliance on foreign countries. Other maritime nations seem to understand this basic principle of Mahan. Imagine, if you might, a Canadian design of a Canadian major combat system in a French or British warship! It has never and will never happen because of the protective policies of those governments.

For NSPS to succeed, Canada needs to invest in Canada. One dollar spent in a foreign country never gets spent in Canada and is lost forever, whereas a dollar spent in Canada is re-spent in Canada many times over, increasing economic growth and contributing to our ability to remain a maritime nation. Yes, there are Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs) that oblige foreign countries to invest in Canada, but IRBs are not what Mahan had in mind when he stated: “... that can provide intelligent direction, promote the growth and strength of sea-going commerce and build a strong navy.” He advocated for, as has Jenkins, an industrial strategy to create and support a Canadian naval and maritime industrial base. We must recognize that simply relying on IRBs as an investment tool, without implementing a strategic investment plan, will not lead to the development of our naval and maritime industrial base which is fundamental to the success of the NSPS. Mahan was clear, build the industrial base to build and sustain the navy, otherwise the nation will not be a maritime nation. NSPS and the programs under are but the beginning, not the end. Canada will require more ships, with different capabilities. Refocusing our approach to one of strategic investment to align with Mahan’s principles will build the foundation to deliver, on an ongoing basis, Canada’s navy. The Canadian government with the NSPS, took a bold strategic decision that, as a maritime nation, Canada needs the wherewithal to build, deliver and sustain her federal fleets. This being the case, strategic investment, not IRBs, are needed.

It is worth noting that Canada can build ships. Our current Halifax-class fleet of frigates, designed and built in Canada, are among the most integrated and the most capable in the world. Moreover, ton for ton they also provided the government the best value when compared to other nation’s offerings.

National strategic initiatives such as the NSPS, and reports such as the Jenkins report, do not create a detailed road map to the future, and although they are part of a discussion, they are not a final answer. They are based on national strategic considerations for the benefit of Canada and Canadians.

Recognizing the importance to their national security and national economies, many nations have protective defence and security industrial policies. Canada needs to take a similar approach for her own national security and economic interests. But to do so, the government and the bureaucracy must not be side-tracked by commentators warning about a fictional “military industrial complex” or the false allure of foreign off-the-shelf cheap acquisitions or a process-driven, easy way out.

Canada, to reap the investment needed by NSPS in securing our place as a prosperous maritime nation, needs to find the leadership to deliver success, to take the risks needed to succeed and to create relationships that will enable and make possible the successful fulfillment of NSPS. Canada must also trust that her people have the initiative, the entrepreneurial capacity and the wherewithal to fulfil the Prime Minister’s words; if we do not, we as a nation, fail.

Ian Parker served in the Canadian Navy for thirty-seven years, retiring as a Captain(N). He is at present a Defence and Security Advisor. This article was originally published in FrontLine magazine.
An update...

We continue to make progress on the issues discussed at our AGM in Victoria this past June. Time and space do not allow me to cover progress on each of the issues so perhaps I can update you on a few.

Communications

Member communications was identified as the priority. NAC NEWS has been very well received. As you will see from this issue of Starshell, we are beginning to discuss naval affairs more broadly and thanks to Bob Bush our website continues to both improve and expand. A LinkedIn discussion group was also started and will find increased traffic as we expand debate on the need for a strong Navy. However, we cannot deliver information and discussion by these new avenues without your email. If you aren’t receiving NAC NEWS, please send me your email address immediately and make sure your Branch records are up to date.

Naval Reserve

A priority identified at our meetings was to establish contact with the Naval Reserve (NR) to examine how NAC and the NR might improve relationships to our mutual benefit—and that of Canada. As a starting point I met briefly with Commodore David Craig head of our Naval Reserve. Following this, each Branch provided an assessment of its relationship with its local reserve unit. Cmdre Craig simultaneously took a quick look at the NAC relationship from the NR unit perspective.

Shortly before the holidays, I again met with Cmdre Craig. He is enthused about improving and developing our relationship, however, things had gone slower than might be expected due to significant changes in the Reserve now underway. You will have heard about some of the changes in the press but there are more to come, including a change in the responsibilities for Cmdre Craig and movement of his position from Québec City to Esquimalt. Although I am far from expert on the topic of our Naval Reserve, the changes described by David sounded positive and I expect they will be welcomed by Reserve Units.

Cmdre Craig and I both came to the conclusion that given the size of the country and the diversity of NAC/Reserve relationships we needed to focus at the start. We agreed that a great candidate location for a pilot effort would be Vancouver where both organizations have strong representation and a history of cooperation. Accordingly, I have asked John McLean to be the point man on this issue. The idea is that John and his counterparts at Discovery will take a look at how our two organizations can cooperate to our mutual advantage. John Anderson of our Toronto Branch has asked to also be involved. Hopefully this work will result in a set of ideas which can then be implemented nationwide. Thank you John(s) for taking this on.

Introductory Members

We have discussed changing the demographic of NAC by attracting younger members. Two groups were suggested. The first is those retiring, who have had a career with the RCN, who one might expect have an affinity for the RCN and therefore the aims of the NAC. They may come from naval, military, civil service or naval associated industry backgrounds. The second group is those just embarking on a naval career—be they sailors or Naval Cadets. We might also want to consider those not entering the service who are pursuing a career of related studies.

It is suggested NAC will benefit from those just retiring which will help bring NAC up-to-date knowledge. New retirees also help by providing links to those still serving, in particular the leadership of the RCN. At the other end of the career path, those just entering the system offer us the opportunity to acquire life-long members.

It was suggested that NAC establish a category of dues called Introductory. Candidates would not have to pay dues and would be restricted to reception of services which do not have a significant overhead cost for the Association. They would not receive any magazine or printed documents but would be able to access electronic versions.

This fall the NAC Board approved the following motion:

Moved that the Naval Association of Canada introduce a membership dues level for National membership whereby new RCN entrants undergoing initial training (for one year or until commissioned, whichever comes later) would be accepted as Introductory Level members at no charge to the member. Retiring RCN or RCN civil servants would be offered an Introductory level membership good for one year following their date of retirement. Such Introductory members would receive all the benefits of membership with the restriction that newsletters be delivered electronically. Branches are very strongly encouraged to introduce Introductory membership at the Branch level.
The Ottawa Branch has been offering a membership dues level such as this to retiring service members, even though it did not collect from the individual and the Branch had to pay National. This motion removes the obligation for a Branch to pay National during the introductory term. This approach has been quite successful in bringing retired officers and NCMs on board.

There are four major universities in the NAC Ottawa catchment area (Carleton, U of Ottawa, Queens and RMC) and RMC would seem to be the best candidate to help us establish how we can involve Naval Cadets. Bob Hamilton has volunteered to be the RMC contact and I have strong connections as President of the RMC Foundation. At the RMC end, Cdr Mike Mooz, RMC Chief of Staff, is the senior naval officer. Similar to our initiative to reach out to the Naval Reserve through a pilot project it is hoped that the lessons learned in this project will be repeatable at universities across the country.

**Naval Affairs**

The sharp end of the NAC is, I submit, our ability to share ideas and debate the future of the RCN. The NAC needs well-developed research, thoughtful articles and best ideas to help ensure Canada has the Navy it needs in the 21st century.

While active in the '90s, particularly in support of submarine and helicopter discussions of the day, NAC involvement in Naval Affairs went into recession. Recently we have been working to develop authors, publish papers, deliver current news to members, improve and expand our website and debate with the Conference of Defence Associations and its Institute regarding their treatment of naval issues.

This edition of *Starshell* bears testament to progress as it contains three quality articles in the area of Naval Affairs which I hope will engender discussion. They are a paper by Paul Mitchell entitled: "Deal of the Century," examining the case for submarines; an historical paper by Mike Young, “One Hundred Years of Submarines in the RCN,” and “Perhaps Start with Mahan” by Ian Parker.

The papers, along with others Association authors have written over the years, will be on line at our website under Naval Affairs. Discussion will expand to our LinkedIn interest group at: [http://www.linkedin.com/groups/NAVACLASSOCIATION-CANADA-6547216?trk=my_groups-b-grp-v](http://www.linkedin.com/groups/NAVACLASSOCIATION-CANADA-6547216?trk=my_groups-b-grp-v) which now has 121 participants.

**Naming of Ships**

I have received quite a bit of correspondence on the issue of the recently announced names of the Joint Support Ships (JSS)—none of it enthusiastic for the announced choices. The NAC supports the government in its understanding of the need to bring this long-standing procurement project one step closer to realization, and it is one of our core mandates to celebrate the proud history of our nation. The War of 1812 was a great demonstration of the importance of British sea power in blockading the American economy so that the seaboard states would not support the land conflict. Still, to name the JSSs after the land battles at Queenston [Heights] and Chateauguay, to many seems a little strange.

Many of us now fear that future ship classes will follow this trend and be named for WWI and WWII battles. A possible course, except it will have limited naval options. The RCN has no great sea battles to celebrate from WWI, and HMCS Battle of the Atlantic or HMCS Gulf of St. Lawrence don’t exactly roll off the tongue. Most importantly, the RCN tradition is that ships’ battle honours can only be perpetuated by re-using the names of ships that won these honours. Would those making these decisions ever even consider renaming Army regiments with the loss of traditions this would entail? If not, how can they do exactly this to the RCN?

I want to propose that the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships and the destroyer–frigate replacement Canadian Surface Combatant resurrect many of the proud names of our ships with great battle honours from WWII. I submit the naming of HMC Ships should be done out of respect for the proud heritage of the RCN.

I will put this up as a discussion topic on our LinkedIn Interest Group. Send me your thoughts.

**In Conclusion**

The NAC is once again growing both in terms of numbers, but also as importantly, in terms of attracting younger members, members from across the naval community and those from industry and government who are our essential partners in making sure Canada has the Navy it needs. Please get involved with your Branches to not only maintain this course, but increase our SOA.
Where did 2013 go? First I would like to provide an update on where we stand getting government approval for our Articles of Continuance and By-Laws that were approved at the AGM in June last year.

Initial reports of turnaround times at Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) proved to be slightly optimistic and in late November we received a request for additional information. Working with Derek Greer, we compiled the response to the request and it was mailed to CRA on the 10th of January 2014. Now that our file is open and active in CRA it is hoped that our next communication will be quicker and that we will receive approval of our Articles with respect to maintaining our charitable status as a Not for Profit Association.

With full confidence that the paperwork will be approved, it is now time to turn our attention to revising the Guidance Manual. A few of the changes envisioned include expanded instructions to meet many of the requirements imposed by the Canada Not For Profit Corporations Act, additional requirements for record keeping, updating of the Awards and Endowment Fund sections and a general restructuring of the sections with the by-laws existing as their own section. While the list is not comprehensive, it is clear that there is a significant effort needed and input from all Branches will be solicited. A timeline is to have the revised document complete and ready for a full review before the end of June so that last minute changes can be made and the document tabled for approval at the October AGM.

The call has been put out for nominations for Naval Association of Canada Awards to recognize the contributions and dedication of our members at the local, community and national levels. Nominations are due by March 31st and will be announced and presented at the Annual General Meeting in Ottawa in October. When members see others being recognized in such a way it highlights not only the work of that person, but also that we as an Association value and recognize their effort. Through our NAC Awards program we also aspire to encourage others to step forward and get more involved.

The call is also out for Endowment Fund grant applications. It is anticipated that at least $28,000 will be available for worthy projects and causes this year. Applications are due by April 11th for consideration in this fiscal year. The Endowment Fund Allocation Committee compares all applications together to ensure the objects of NAC and regional representation are fairly considered, so for that reason applications received after April 11th cannot be considered and will need to be resubmitted next year as appropriate.

The website continues to evolve and our Webmaster, Bob Bush, has invested considerable time in working to make it modern and relevant. I have asked all Branches for important dates in 2014 and will be putting them on the website as I get them. Check it out on the national site [ www.navalassoc.ca ] as the first effort should be posted by the time you read this issue of Starshell.

Another issue we are dealing with is our membership lists. The President is devoting considerable time to compiling and distributing interesting articles relevant to the RCN and NAC. If you are not receiving his emails, please ensure that your Branch has your correct email address and that they have passed it to me and the President. You should feel free to contact me if you have any concerns about your information being correct on our database.

Finally, and as alluded to earlier in this piece, the dates for the NAC Conference and AGM have been set. The Conference will be Thursday, October 2nd and the Annual General Meeting will be Saturday, October 4th. Please mark your calendars and plan on attending.

Just as happened in Victoria last year, the UNTD annual meeting will occur in the same timeframe and we look forward to having many of those members attending as well.

Ken
A bit of ‘supply trivia.’ One of my appointments when I spent time in NDHQ as the Director of Personnel Stores was the responsibility for purchasing all the food, clothing, medical supplies, etc. When I took up my appointment I was told a large order of sailor’s collars was due from the RN. What we did not know was they would be light blue, not dark blue as was the case for RCN collars. Apparently the RN issued light blue collars to the RN’s Mediterranean fleet. It was also apparent the RN had an unusual surplus of the light blue collars which they wanted to get rid of … the RCN was the goat! You can imagine my shock when they arrived … all light blue! I had one helluva time explaining the mix-up to supply depots across the country. No one wanted to wear light blue collars. The Starshell cover reminded me of the fiasco which haunted me for at least a year or two!

Fred Fowlow, Calgary Branch

THE TETTIS BOLT (Mail Call: “Schober’s Quiz #62,” pp. 13 & 24, Summer 2013 issue Starshell; Mail Call: (Letter to the Editor), p 10 “Schober’s Quiz #62,” Autumn 2013 issue Starshell.)

In his comment on Schober’s Quiz #62 in the Autumn issue of Starshell, Mike Hurford mentioned the “Thetis Bolt.” I believe the usually accepted term is ‘Thetis Clip” and it is a simple but extremely effective mechanical interlock device. It prevents the torpedo tube from being opened initially more than a fraction so that if the tube is full and water gushes out, the door can be easily and quickly shut. It was fitted on all British (and UK-built RAN and RCN) submarines after the Thetis incident. Whether it continued into the nuclear submarine era is not known, but mess-deck rumour had it that it was not originally included in the Upholder tube design. Again according to that impeccable source, there was an incident with Upholder on trials and the clip reinstated in the class. Does anyone know if the Victoria’s have it?

Also if memory serves, RN boats had additional mechanical interlock that stopped the rear door opening lever from being actuated when the outer door was open. Unlike the Thetis Clip however, this one could be bypassed deliberately.

Mike Young, NAC Ottawa, (former s/m Torpedo Officer)

SHE MAY NOT BE PRETTY, BUT… (Mail Call: “Beauty and the Beast,” Fraser McKee, p. 10, Autumn 2013 Starshell: the RN’s new Type 45 Daring-class destroyers.)

One Stop Ship – The Royal Navy’s newest recruit can destroy an entire air force in two minutes. In an unfought war, the Royal Navy Type 45 destroyer HMS Dragon is a ‘picket ship’ for an American aircraft carrier group attacked in the Persian Gulf, poised to defend the group from surprise attack. Their enemy’s objective is to swamp the defences of the Western vessels with volleys of sea-skimming guided missiles from shore batteries and aircraft, until a missile gets through to the carrier. But HMS Dragon is the world’s most advanced air-defence ship and it is for just such a scenario that she has been designed.

The Dragon’s radar plots and prioritizes each new threat—up to 10,000 of them. Simultaneously the ship’s computers lock onto up to eight targets at a time, running complex algorithms to decide the optimum moment of reply. Dragon’s own Sea Viper missiles blast out of weapons silos beneath her forward deck reaching four times the speed of sound in two seconds. These, says her captain, Cdr Darren Austen, can “hit a cricket ball travelling at three times the speed of sound 50 miles away.”

If ordered, the full arsenal of 48 missiles could be automatically targeted and launched by the ship’s computers in two or three seconds, equivalent of the destructive capability of almost the entire combat aircraft fleet of Argentina.

In 1906, HMS Dreadnought stunned the world’s navies with its speed, structural innovation and unmatched weaponry, heralding a design revolution on the high seas. Almost 100 years later some RN officers compare the arrival of the six Type 45 destroyers, at £1 billion each, to the arrival of the Dreadnought. Eighty percent of the technology of the Type 45 is new and looks strikingly different from its predecessors. Much of its equipment is hidden by a ‘clean’ angled superstructure of steel and composite materials designed to scatter rather than reflect enemy radar. The result is a vessel that appears on radar like a small fishing boat
rather than an 8,500 ton craft.

This is 4,000 tonnes more than the Navy’s previous destroyer class, the Type 42. The bigger ship’s bulk acts as a counterbalance to the two huge radars mounted 50m above sea level, which can see wave-top missiles over the horizon. But greater technological integration means the crew of 190 is almost 100 fewer than the old Type 42 class, and living conditions are consequently spacious.

The radars combine to build a 3D picture more than 320km away, feeding data into a command centre where it can be shared and overlaid with that of any other friendly ship—even those thousands of miles away.

A further innovation is the ship’s propulsion system—she is the first warship to run on electrical power, generated by a diesel turbine. She produces 45 megawatts of power, says ship’s engineer Lt Jamie Vaughn, equivalent to that used by a city of 60,000. But fuel use is 22% more efficient than her predecessor, and she can steam for 7,000 nautical miles at 18 knots thanks to fuel tanks with the capacity of half an Olympic swimming pool.

Edison-Brown, NOABC

(Ed.)

Admirals’ Medal seeks nominations

The Admirals’ Medal (established in 1985 in conjunction with the 75th anniversary of the Naval Service of Canada) provides a means by which outstanding achievements in Canadian maritime activities can be publicly recognized. The name of the medal is associated with the diverse achievements of three distinguished men, now all deceased. Their outstanding personal performance illustrates how individuals can make a permanent impact on the development of maritime affairs in Canada.

A group of prominent Canadians with backgrounds in various maritime fields serve on the Awards Committee and make the award annually, except when no qualified recipient is nominated.

NOMINATIONS – The Foundation invites nominations for the award of the Admirals’ Medal. Individuals and organizations who are in a position to identify outstanding achievement in the wide range of maritime affairs are urged to submit nominations. Nominees need not be members of any organization or a member of the nominating organization.

Nominations close on March 1st annually, and should be made by letter with the nomination form (to be requested from the Executive Secretary—see contact information below) fully completed. Please include relevant biographical information, a brief description of the work, achievement or display of practical skill that it is proposed to recognize, along with the name of the individual or organization submitting the recommendations.

Nominations and all correspondence related to the Admirals’ Medal should be addressed to:

Executive Secretary
The Admirals’ Medal Foundation
PO Box 505, Ottawa, ON K1P 5P6
Email: Richard.Gimblett@forces.gc.ca
Telephone: 613-971-7696
Facsimile: 613-971-7677

Long Serving CO of HMCS Cabot retires

A ceremony was held on October 19th in St. John’s, NF to mark the retirement of former CO of HMCS Cabot, and member of NLNAC, LCdr Margaret Morris following 42 years of service … a rare achievement indeed! L to R in the above photo are Lorne Wheeler, President NLNAC, Cdr Larry Trim, CO CFS St. John’s, LCdr Shannon Lewis-Simpson, current CO of HMCS Cabot and LCdr Margaret Morris.

Film production company seeks wartime participants of action in Chaleur Bay, September 1943

Yap Films, a production company located in Toronto, Ontario, is seeking anyone who was in the wartime RCN and operated in Chaleur Bay (Baie des Chaleurs) during the month of September 1943.

The specific incident they are interested in, involved an escaped German prisoner-of-war and the attempted capture of a German U-boat, U 536. The ships they believe were involved were HMCS Rimouski, Chelsea, Agassiz, Shawinigan, Lethbridge, Mahone, Swift Current, Chedabucto, Ungava and Granby.

Any information would be greatly appreciated. Please contact the following:

James Ellis,
Senior Researcher, Yap Films
jellis@yapfilms.com • Telephone: 1-416-843-8714
Endowment Fund donation in Victoria

An Endowment Fund donation of $6,000 was recently presented to the Broadmead Care Society in Victoria. L to R above are Dave Cheperdak, CEO Broadmead Care Society, Derek Greer, NAC National Treasurer, Paul Morgan Vice-Chair Broadmead Society Board, and Michael Morres, President NOAVI. The donation will be used for the purchase of a medication dispensary cart (5K) and two geomattresses for the Lodge at Broadmead.

London Branch honours those lost at sea

The above newspaper image is from the front page of the London Free Press on November 4th, 2013. It shows Mark Van Den Bossche, President of NAC London and his family placing poppies on the stone of HMCS Valleyfield. This is an annual ceremony that takes place at the start of Remembrance Week in London. A poppy is placed for each sailor lost. Poppies vary in number depending on the ship, i.e., Trentonian–6, Athabaskan–129. The pictures are an attempt to place a photo of each sailor lost on the appropriate stone. Last year they placed 150, this year there are up to 500.

Medallion recipients in Thunder Bay

During Weepers in HMCS Griffon, Thunder Bay, ON, November 1st, 2013, NAC Medallions were awarded as follows: L to R Bronze Award recipients M. O. Nelson and Brad Yeo; Gold awards, George Kearney and Ray Zuliani.

Diamond Jubilee Medal presented in Montréal

During a recent ceremony, Bernard Cornell (left), outgoing President Montréal Branch, presented the Diamond Jubilee Medal to Dennis G. Baird who is taking over as Branch President.

Joint Support Ships named

The Hon Rob Nicholson Minister of National Defence, announced on October 25th last that the RCN’s two new Joint Support Ships (JSS) will be named HMCS Queenston and Chateauguay in recognition of the significant battles of Queenston Heights and Chateauguay during the War of 1812.

“The names recognize the achievements and sacrifices of those early Canadian soldiers who fought and died in these critical battles during the War of 1812,” said Minister Nicholson. “The War of 1812 was a defining moment in our country’s history that contributed to shaping our identity as Canadians and ultimately our existence as a country.”

“Canada’s rich military history is a source of inspiration for the men and women who currently serve in the Royal Canadian Navy,” said VAdm Mark Norman, Commander RCN.

Traditionally the name of the class of warship is derived from the name of the first vessel in this class to be constructed. HMCS Queenston will be built first, therefore, the two JSS will be known as the Queenston-class.
Plaque honours HMCS Star

Bob Williamson (left, wearing the uniform of a senior naval officer in the War of 1812), oversees the unveiling of the plaque in late October 2013 by Hamilton Historical Board Plaquing Chairman Robin McKee, and LCdr G. Woolfrey, Commanding Officer of HMCS Star.

This past October, the City of Hamilton Historical Board (HHB) paid tribute to the long naval history of this city by presenting a Heritage Recognition Bicentennial Plaque to our Naval Reserve Division, HMCS Star. With a parade of 150 naval reservists looking on with pride, the Commanding Officer, LCdr G. Woolfrey, CD and HHB Plaquing Chairman, Robin McKee, unveiled the plaque. Myself, wearing the costume of a senior naval officer of the War of 1812, drafted the wording and designed the plaque.

In my address to the ship’s company I observed that this project was thirty years in the making. After stepping down from command of HMCS Star in 1988, I wrote the history of the Reserve Division to draw attention to the navy’s contribution to our history on the Great Lakes.

Finally, with the celebration of the Bicentennial of the War of 1812, the Canadian government has awarded Star with a Defence of Canada banner (left background in above photo). To augment with a Defence of Canada banner (left background in above photo). To augment this, the HHB Heritage Recognition Plaque describes how the first warship named Star launched on Lake Ontario in 1813, fought successfully to preserve our nation.

Bob Williams, NAC Toronto (Hamilton)

A bold new look for the Halifax waterfront was revealed on Thursday, January 23rd when the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust released the concept design for **BATTLE of the ATLANTIC PLACE**, a structure proposed as a legacy of the 150th anniversary of Confederation.

The culmination of years of work by a dedicated team of volunteers and the result of an intensive period of design and planning, the concept will show how the proposed facility will present the amazing story of Canadians who brought about success in the Battle of the Atlantic. Once funding is secured, **BATTLE of the ATLANTIC PLACE** will be ready to receive visitors in time for Canada’s 150th birthday in 2017.

The structure will house HMCS Sackville, the living embodiment of an extraordinary period in our history, which symbolizes Canada’s national commitment to winning the Battle of the Atlantic. It is more than an old ship on the Halifax waterfront: it is a steel-hulled piece of history that stands not only for Canada’s vital role in the Allied effort in the war, but also as a tangible tribute to the men and women who have served Canada at sea, on land, in the air and just as importantly, at home.

When fully realized, **BATTLE of the ATLANTIC PLACE** will stand out as a visually compelling structure, a gathering place right on the shore of Halifax Harbour, steps away from the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic and the city’s downtown, and accessible all year round.

It will present the story of a generation of Canadians who are now passing—a generation which overcame adversity with resourcefulness, courage and determination. It will be a metaphor for what a nation can do to succeed when facing incredible challenges.

**BATTLE of the ATLANTIC PLACE** will not be a museum. It will tell the story of Canadian accomplishment in an innovative, technologically immersive manner, which will have a profound effect on Canadians and visitors from around the world. Its daring design will make it an instant landmark and a striking addition to the waterfront.

www.battleoftheatlanticplace.ca
For further information contact
Battle of the Atlantic Place Project Office
Telephone: 902-492-1424 – Email: office@battleoftheatlanticplace.ca
This will have to do

The serialized naval memoirs of RAdm Robert Philip ‘Bob’ Welland
DSC & Bar, MiD, psc, Officer of the Legion of Merit (USA), RCN

Part Two ~ The East Indies Squadron

EDITOR’S NOTE – We rejoin Admiral Welland in early 1937 having just completed his midshipman’s training with the Royal Navy, and with the knowledge he had been posted to HMS Emerald effective May 1st, that year, following a most welcome three weeks’ leave with relatives living in London.

HMS Emerald, was not painted grey like other warships, she looked like a giant luxury yacht. A closer look unveiled eight heavy guns, sixteen torpedo tubes, and aircraft mounted on a catapult, a crew of six hundred, and down below, turbines that could drive her at 34 knots. She was my home for eighteen adventurous months. The East Indies Squadron consisted of three cruisers, based in ‘Trinco.’ From this base the Navy controlled the empire of colonies spread throughout the Indian Ocean, along the African coast and into the Malay Peninsula. Emerald visited these ‘possessions’ on a prearranged schedule that gave local authorities plenty of time to prepare our welcome. Arrangements always included sporting events, parades, parties on board and a refresher for the locals on how best to demonstrate exemplary behaviour. The ‘Colonial Governor’ was always a central figure.

For the reader who was not around at this time in history, the British Empire was painted pink on world maps and occupied about one-third of the earth’s land surface. There were no tourists, no passenger aircraft, only a few wealthy people travelled in my father’s P&O steamships. News was not broadcast internationally because there was no long-range ‘voice’ radio, only morse code. The word ‘television’ hadn’t been coined as the technology was ten years away from being invented. Yet there was still plenty to do.

Our soccer team was frequently beaten by barefoot black men in Dar es Salem, Calcutta, the Andaman Islands and the Seychelles, and also by smaller, oriental men in Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur.

Our cricket team was equally dismal. The locals earned these outcomes and enjoyed our ‘agon of defeat.’ They usually arranged games to be played either side of high noon. Mr. Kipling should have said: “Mad dogs and Englishmen, ‘and native competitive teams,’ go out in the noonday sun.” They thoroughly enjoyed watching us melt.

At each place the ship was opened to the public. A special reception was held for the local ‘Poobahs’ and their ladies on our teak quarterdeck under the red-striped awning. Exotic folks graced these receptions; huge men, chiefs of their tribe, dressed in golden robes, feathered headdress, with black gleaming skin. Some wore wide blue velvet ribbons, the British Order of the Garter (or whatever). They were accompanied by just-as-huge ladies in more grand get-ups. Precious stones were liberally strewn over enough gleaming hide to make ten pair of ‘Guccis.’

In the Muslim countries, only men attended our Captain’s receptions: sheiks robed in white, with voracious appetites for our food and drink. A few knew that special drinks (booze) could be had in the Captain’s cabin, and that a midshipman was the key to finding the way. Lieutenant Edwards, our ‘Snottie’s Nurse’ told us: “Allah won’t mind as long as they don’t get too plastered.”

It was these colourful characters who really ran their countries and used Emerald, the power of the Empire, with her shiny white paint, smiling behind her big guns, to hold their grip on the population. As long as their interests matched those of far-off London, peace and quiet reigned. Even a twenty-year old midshipman knew these were the rules.

Whenever a crack in the facade developed, the booze and coloured awnings were displaced by sterner stuff. In Madras, in southern India, we landed four hundred armed men, myself included, to support the British Army. We demonstrated to Mr. Gandhi’s followers that
peace and quiet was a good thing. His mob were told to stop overturning streetcars; our Vickers machine guns were in the street to aid understanding.

At Hodeida, in the Yemen, we gave a demonstration of fire power. A salvo of explosive eight-inch shells ripped up a hillside. That elevated the understanding of local sheiks on the evils of slave trading across the Red Sea. In Palestine we landed to support the British Army who, even then (1938) were trying to stop the Arabs and Jews from blowing each other up with stolen hand grenades. I spent two days in charge of a road block; I was camped on Mount Carmel outside Haifa. History has shown I wasted my time.

Augustus Agar was the captain of the Emerald. He wore the Victoria Cross and numerous other medals for heroic exploits in World War I. He was credited with sinking the Russian cruiser Oleg, with his motor torpedo boat. He was tall and athletic; he wore his hair long in pompadour style, stuffing most of it under his cap. He seemed to take great interest in the welfare of the crew, including the midshipmen, going so far as to know our names.

His wife was frequently embarked for long voyages. She was slim, elegant, looked like an actress and laughed a lot. She and the captain paced the quarterdeck for exercise several times a day. They seemed to be great pals, he called her ‘Boo’ and she called him ‘Bunny.’ They went perfectly with our all-white ship, the sheiks and the chiefs, and the drinks on the teak quarterdeck.

At ship’s concerts, Mrs. Agar sang the popular songs. At Sunday church she played the organ. She was a consistent winner in the officers’ bridge tournaments. ‘Boo’ and the ship’s dog were everyone’s favourites.

It was unusual in 1938 for a warship captain to have his wife on board, although that had been a common practice in sailing ship days, but Gus was a famous officer. Moreover, he gave the impression he really didn’t give a damn about naval formalities and would sooner be playing polo or golf than promoting the Empire. We toured the African coast and had fun with the ‘Crossing the Line’ ceremony. Everyone got a fancy certificate signed by Father Neptune. Gus always took a lead part in the entertainment and abuse.

We midshipmen were required to write a daily journal of the ship’s doings. Once a week our work was presented for criticism to the instructor officer, an Oxford don doing his naval reserve time. He cared little about the events described, only about improper English, weary discourses and bad handwriting. “I wish boredom were punishable by flogging,” he wrote across one of my efforts. Once a fortnight we were set a problem by our ‘nurse,’ Lt. Edwards, and required to write an “Appreciation of the Situation.” The object was to acquaint us with ‘officer type’ problems and develop our powers of expression and critical sense. That’s what the instructional manual said. The situations set might be quelling a riot in one of the colonies; refueling and supplying distant island operations; planning a reception for a mixed group of Muslim Imams, Jewish Rabbis or Greek-Orthodox priests. We knew these ‘appreciations’ were regarded as important to our careers; seniority could be gained by doing them well.

One such appreciation had us at war with the Japanese; our ship was in the China Sea searching for the Jap fleet. Each midshipman was to cast himself in the role of pilot of our seaplane. He was to create a search plan that considered the aircraft’s endurance, radio performance, navigational and so on. Two days after Mid John Roxburgh turned in his appreciation, the ship’s executive officer, Cdr. Boutwood (known as the ‘Yellow Peril’ because of his disposition and skin colour through eating atabrine malaria drugs) sent for Roxborough. Roxborough had carefully measured the distance from the ship to the coast of China and found the fuel load would give him a few minutes to spare if he flew directly to it [but] none to get back to the ship. He explained that were he to look for the Japanese and find them, they would shoot him down with their much superior aircraft, the new Type II Zero
fighters armed with eight .5 inch machine guns, and that he would lose his life. Also, as they became aware of the British presence, they would promptly locate our ship, then sink it with their new twin-engine ‘Betty’ torpedo bombers, each of which carried two parachute-deployed 18-inch torpedoes. He concluded it would be folly to look for them as finding them would put not only himself at deadly risk, but jeopardize the lives of his beloved shipmates.

So he flew his Fairey Seafax to the coast and set the little seaplane down near a beach and traded it to the Chinese for first-class train fare to the colony of Hong Kong.

This flagrant dereliction of duty upset Boutwood and Roxborough was roundly lectured. “When I told him I was joking,” Roxborough told us he said, “So am I, your leave is stopped for a month.” Gus Agar and ‘Boo’ quickly learned of the clever appreciation and Boutwood was ordered to cancel the punishment. A few years later in the war, Roxborough became an outstanding submarine commander and wound up his career as an admiral commanding the British submarine fleet.

Gus encouraged us to criticize the system. Occasionally he would have us midshipmen into his cabin for cards and take the opportunity to tell us what the navy ought to be doing instead of what it was doing. “We will be at war with the Germans and Japanese within five years,” he told us. “The navy is still building battleships, lots of them. Even one is too many, we ought to be building aircraft carriers and developing new planes.”

Gus told us the navy was ruled by battleship gunnery officers who had won World War I (according to them) and they were now the admirals in London. “We are behind the Americans in carriers and aircraft, behind the Japanese in both, behind the Germans in submarines, we are neglecting anti-submarine warfare and anti-aircraft defence of our ships.” He said the only bright spot was the Germans building battleships, “Pissing away their resources, like us.” At one of these sessions I asked why the British held onto India as a colony. He said, “Because they’re black, and we can get away with it.”

Singapore was a major naval base, it held the strategic stores for the East Indies fleet and also for the China fleet, gun ammunition, torpedoes, fuel oil in a vast array of tanks, cranes on the dockside that could lift a 1,500 ton gun turret out of a battleship and put a new one back in. In 1938 a new drydock was completed. It was capable of handling the largest warships and the huge new commercial liners — Queen Mary at 80,000 tons — and a new one being built that was even larger. Britain ruled the seas, I was part of it. It was a good time to be a midshipman in the navy. There was plenty to be proud of. But Captain Gus Agar made us think about what might happen next.

I knew from my instruction in radio that the Royal Navy was in touch with everywhere in the world. All the red parts of the globe were connected by high-speed morse radio; no other country had such ability. The occasional ‘Appreciation’ required us to defend, destroy, occupy, recapture the massive radio stations and their ‘antenna farms’ in remote parts of the Empire. The ‘Stone Cutters’ station in Hong Kong represented an opportunity to be imaginative; it was surrounded by once-enemy clever citizens who had invented explosives! Our sailors could send messages home from where ever we were. It was magical and I was trained to take an active part. Every morning at daybreak I was required to practice morse on a key or a light! A small part, but a part. It would have been a great system to have had between Ochre Beach and McCreary [Manitoba].

The ceremony to celebrate the opening of the new dock found the ships of the East Indies and China fleets gathered in Singapore harbour; thousands of sailors played soccer against the Army, Air Force, each other, and the local teams. Rowing and sailing races added to the busy program. American and French warships had been invited. The Empire was doing its thing, rubbing in that Singapore was important, would be defended, and Japanese, Italians and Germans ought to pay attention. I remember that being my simplistic assessment, noting the Japanese had been conquering the Chinese for years and continued to do so; the Italians had taken Eritrea and the British complained but did nothing; the Germans armed and supported a revolution in Spain, extolled the virtues of Nazism and had already captured Austria and the Czechs. So it really wasn’t that hard to figure out why the British were trying to gain a little ground with a splash about their super fortress, Singapore. We midshipmen in our gunroom talked about these things; Landymore tried to get Lt. Edwards, our ‘nurse,’ to set the world political scene and what Britain should do about it as a subject for our bi-weekly ‘Appreciation of the Situation.’ No dice, too touchy; Boutwood would have killed our popular ‘nurse’ if his midshipmen criticized the management of the Empire.

On the day of the new drydock opening my job was to ferry our Royal Marine band from the ship to the dock, which was located at the back of Singapore Island facing the mainland of Malaya, a twenty mile run. I was coxswain of this forty-foot picket boat, a high-speed craft with three V8 engines that could make 30 knots. I
A review by Fraser McKee, NAC Toronto

The larger stories of the Battle of the Atlantic, in fact the naval war in general, have been published in a thousand volumes. The official US Navy history runs to fifteen volumes; I hold two shelves of hard cover books on the Battle of the Atlantic alone — probably 10% of what’s available. Now, as I’ve been urging in editorials and articles, we are filling in the more personal bits and pieces — rather like those 1,500 piece jigsaw puzzles, mostly completed but with missing bits of sky, water or fields. This small semi-pocket sized book is a great addition to the historiography of Canada’s war at sea, well worth adding to anyone’s shelf.

Donald Bowman was, like so many, from Regina, and attending engineering at the university, when he and a friend resolved to join the Navy, although he had spent a year in the Army’s COTC. He joined at HMCS Unicorn as a seaman, did basic training there briefly, thence to Cornwallis in 1943. His descriptions of those experiences will ring a bell for any that went through similar introduction to the Service — surprise at the casual nature of ‘fiddles’ being worked, boat-pulling and sailing in Annapolis Basin against the massive tides, punishment drill in the Gun Battery. On graduation, because of his university years, Bowman was commissioned an Acting Sub-Lieutenant (temporary) — the Navy needed to be sure it really wanted or could use you. Dates in his story are scarce, so it’s a little difficult to establish a clear time line; but since this is just a ‘tale for the telling’ that is not really very vital.

On his promotion and ‘graduation’ leave he returned to Saskatoon to get married and for a week’s leave, thence to HMCS Discovery in Vancouver for initial experience and to try out his introduction to ‘Officer-Like Qualities’ as the little handbook called them. In early 1944 he travelled to HMCS Kings in Halifax for a month’s training. (This seems very short, given I was there about four months later for at least four months, but maybe things were more urgent at his time.) On graduation he was appointed to the corvette Edmunston, being refitted for her extended foc’sle at Liverpool, NS. He was to spend the remainder of the war in her, promoted to Lieutenant and granted his watchkeeping certificate. Edmunston was paid off at Sorel, Quebec in June 1945.

In that ship, as part of mid-ocean Group EG C-8, she operated between St. John’s and Londonderry, and here Bowman’s stories are both typical and unique to his experiences. Problems with fog and icebergs off Newfoundland, damaged freighters,
U-boat hunts, escapades in ‘Derry and on leave in London, failed experiments with camouflage low night lighting (I hadn’t realized that other than in Jack Pickford’s Rimouski this odd concept had been tried elsewhere) — familiar experiences, yet each unique to this story.

Great stuff! Turns out Edmundston was the first attacker of U 877 with an initial detection and two good depth charge attacks, but her efforts were taken over by two more modern ships, HMCS St. Thomas and Sea Cliff who got credit for sinking her. Seems unfair not to have been mentioned or part-credited.

He seems to have learned quickly, got on well with both his COs and his Sigs, for he was Signals Officer in the ship and tells many brief and well told stories.

The illustrations are a mix of a few personal snaps and Public Archives photos, some quite unique.

Considering it is a tale of some sixty-eight years ago, there are remarkably few errors. As the Signals Officer he cannot be fairly faulted for being off a bit on how depth charges worked, mixing the operation of the primer and the detonator and the timing of attacks, but he has caught the atmosphere exactly.

Bowman was released after some Pacific leave, returned to university and worked in a family auto business and others of his own. He lives independently still, with a VA pension for some problems, like many contemporaries. This is indeed one of those filler pieces for the Canadian naval story and a valuable bit of colour for the whole.

Fraser is the author of several books on the RCN and a former editor of Starshell.

SHEPHERDS OF THE SEA
DESTROYER ESCORTS IN WORLD WAR II

By Robert F. Cross
Naval Institute Press (2010), www.usni.org
Annapolis, MD, paperback & ebook, 320 pp.

A review by Gordon Forbes, NAC Ottawa

The Battle of the Atlantic is a key part of the history of the Royal Canadian Navy and most of us are aware of the twists and turns of that six year fight. The dangers and stresses of the sailors on the corvettes and frigates are well recorded in Canadian naval lore. So it is with some interest that I approached the reading of this book which is subtitled “Destroyer Escorts in World War II” and sets out the story of the United States Navy’s efforts in the same battle.

The story concentrates on the destroyer escorts (DEs) that were reluctantly built by the USN at the behest of the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt. These ships equate very closely with the size and design of our own frigates, being of almost the same size and displacement, and with the same role of ocean escort and anti-submarine warfare. A total of 563 of these ships were built and delivered between 1943 and 1945, some of which were given to the Royal Navy and several other allied navies. They were built in five classes, differing primarily in the design of their main machinery. One of the frustrating aspects of this book is that it gives so little detail of the design and armament of the DEs. Many of the facts I discovered about them came not from Mr. Cross’s book, but from my own copy of Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II.

The author tries to cover a lot of territory from government and US Navy policy and decision making to stories of individual heroism. There are many stories of submarine kills and DE sinkings at the hands of submarines and aircraft. There are short biographies of some of the officers and men, including Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr., youngest son of the US president, who commanded one of the DEs, the USS Ulvert M. Moore.

Although these ships were built primarily for the Battle of the Atlantic, many of them gave valuable service in the Pacific war battling everything from Japanese submarines to kamikazes to battleships (really)! A lot of ground is covered in the book.

The author is intimately involved in the preservation of the last DE, the ex-USS Slater, now in Albany, New York. He is obviously passionate about the subject of the DEs and has done a lot of research and interviews to get the story.

However, despite the amount of detail included in the book, I found it difficult to read. I have already mentioned the lack of technical details about the ships. What detail that is given is provided in snippets throughout the book. The most difficult part was the way the author mixed a number of topics into single chapters, often without a bridge to explain why he had jumped, for example, from the story of a ship sinking in one paragraph to US Navy shipbuilding priorities in the next.

The book jumps around not only from topic to topic, but also in chronology. There is also the tendency to treat the whole success in the Battle of the Atlantic solely to the US Navy and its DEs. Nothing in the book gives credit to the work of the Royal and Canadian navies, and the fact that they bore the weight of the battle alone through the worst period of the struggle until the arrival of the US DEs in late 1943.

Nonetheless, if you want to see the submarine war through the eyes of another country, this book does provide a lot of information. You just might have to dig a little to find it all.

Gordon Forbes retired from the Canadian Navy in 1988 after a 28 year career as a General List MARS/MARE (CSE) officer. He then worked as a project manager in the defence industry for 20 years before retiring in 2008. He has recently completed the book “We Are As One,” the story of the explosion and fire aboard HMCS Kootenay in 1969. Gord was the Weapons Officer aboard Kootenay at the time of the tragedy. He now lives in the Ottawa suburb of Orleans with his wife Denee and their dog ‘Only.’
**Answer:**

Four. They are, in chronological order: (1) Vice Admiral Miklós Horthy of Nagybánya, Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy (18 June 1868 - 9 February 1957); (2) Admiral of the Fleet François Darlan, French Navy (7 August 1881 - 24 December 1942); Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, Imperial German Navy/German Navy (16 September 1919 - 24 December 1980); and Commodore Josaia Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama, Fijian Navy (27 April 1954 - ).

**Vice Admiral Horthy** – With the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire near the end of the First World War, and the disbandment of its navy, Vice Admiral Horthy retired to his ancestral home in rural Hungary. But during the immediate postwar Communist occupation of Hungary, he was called on by a group of former officers to head right-wing forces that quickly succeeded in ousting the Communists from the country.

On 1 March 1920 Horthy was appointed Regent of the nominal Kingdom of Hungary, a position roughly analogous to President of a republic, which he held between the wars and through most of the Second World War (WWII). He was reluctant to embroil Hungary into WWII, but was eventually coerced by the Axis into declaring war on the Soviet Union on 1 July 1941.

But as early as 1942, Horthy initiated secret peace negotiations with the Western Powers. Inevitably, the Germans learned of them and preemptively occupied Hungary, without firing a shot, on 15 March 1944. On 15 October of that year, with the Soviet Army at the gates of Budapest, Horthy declared a unilateral ceasefire—but the order was not carried out, and on the following day he was forced to resign by the Germans.1

Horthy spent the rest of WWII in an Austrian castle as a guest of Hitler, but was not otherwise harmed. After the war he and his family moved to Portugal where he spent the rest of his days.

**Admiral of the Fleet Darlan** – Following the capitulation of France in 1940 Darlan became one of the principal figures of the Vichy French Régime, retaining overall command of the French Fleet. Shortly before the French surrender he had given his solemn word to Prime Minister Churchill that, come what may, no French warship would be allowed to fall into the hands of the Germans.2 He therefore was deeply incensed by the Royal Navy’s firing on French fleet units at Mers el Kébir on 3 July 1940, which he considered an act of treachery. This event probably was a factor in Darlan’s subsequent collaboration with the Germans.

On 9 February 1941 Marshal Pétain named Darlan to a number of senior government posts additional to his naval appointment, whereby the Admiral became de facto Prime Minister of Vichy France as well as Commander-in-Chief of the French Armed Forces. He served as Head of Government until 18 April 1942, when he was replaced, under German pressure, by Pierre Laval, while retaining his naval and military appointments.

Coincidentally—or perhaps3—Darlan was in Algiers on 8 November 1942, when Allied forces landed at several French North and West African locations, meeting with unexpectedly strong resistance from the Vichy French defenders.4 But two days later Admiral Darlan ordered all French forces in North Africa to cease hostilities against the Allies—an order that was obeyed without question. Consequently on 14 November, the Allies named Darlan “High Commissioner of France for North and West Africa”—which duly enraged Charles de Gaulle.

On 24 December 1942 Darlan was fatally shot in his office by twenty-year-old Fernand Bonnier de La Chapelle, an ardent French Monarchist who resented the admiral’s Republican leanings.

**Grand Admiral Dönitz** – Dönitz did not attain flag rank until October 1, 1939. Yet on 30 January 1943—a scant three years and three months later—he attained the top rank of Grand Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, promoted ahead of a considerably more senior admiral recommended by the outgoing Grand Admiral Räder.

Although Dönitz was not a member of the Nazi Party, it would seem that Hitler had a special regard for him, for on the day before his suicide the Führer named Dönitz to be his successor in the capacity of “President of the Reich.” With Hitler dead on the following day, the 1st of May 1945, leadership of what remained of Germany passed to Admiral Dönitz, who thereupon made the Naval College at Flensburg/Mürwick his headquarters. Dönitz ordered all German Armed Forces to capitulate on 7 May 1945.

Dönitz’s provincial government was dissolved by the Allies on May 23rd and he was taken into custody by the British. In the fall of 1945 he was arraigned before the International War Trials Court at Nuremberg, charged with “Planning aggressive war.” Despite the intervention (in writing) of a number of senior Allied admirals—most notably Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, USN—who considered the charge against Dönitz specious, he was duly convicted and sentenced to 10 years in Spandau prison. After his release from prison in 1956 Dönitz spent his remaining years quietly in retirement, writing two autobiographical books.

**Commodore Bainimarama** – Commodore Bainimarama possesses a most impressive CV. He is a seagoing officer with a number of commands at sea and wide-ranging education and training abroad—including studying “Exclusive Economic Zone Management” at Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS.

In early 2000 Bainimarama was serving as Commander of the Fijian Navy when he took umbrage at the handling of a coup and counter-coup by the Government of Fiji. Accordingly, on 29 May 2000 he spearheaded a coup leading to the establishment of a Provisional Military Government which he headed.

Subsequent to restoration of some semblance of order in the government of Fiji, Bainimarama more-or-less returned to military duty. On 5 February 2004 he was appointed Commander of Fiji Military Forces, but that did not keep him from continually interfering in the country’s governance. Predictably, the Commodore staged another coup in 2006, resulting in his ongoing tenure in several government posts including Minister of Finance and, currently, Prime Minister.

Fijian politics during the last decade are far too complicated to attempt to unravel in this quiz. Suffice to say that the situation is, to say the least, fluid. Very recently Commodore Bainimarama announced that this coming February 28th he would resign from the Navy and as Commander of Fijian Forces, so as to form a new political party and run for election to Prime Minister as a civilian.

1 Schober’s Quiz #59 gives a detailed account of the events leading to Horthy’s resignation.
2 Darlan was as good as his word. On 27 November 1942, when the Germans attempted to seize all French warships present in Toulon, they found every last one of them scuttled by their own crew.
3 It has been alleged that as early as the summer of 1942, Darlan had engaged in secret talks with the Allies concerning the forthcoming North African landings (Operation Torch).
4 Schober’s Quiz #4 gives details regarding Canadian Captain E. T. Peters’ attack at Oran, earning him the Victoria Cross.


In Memoriam (non members)

- **Cdr(P) [LCol] Alexander James ANDERSON, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)

- **Surg LCol John Wilson CLARK, RCNVR (Ret’d)**
  94 in St. Catherines, ON 17/10/13. Jn’d. as Surg Lt 05/41 and srv’d. Naden, with RN 4th Minesweeping Sqn (Overlord) and Stadacona. Rls’d. in ‘46 and prom. Surg Lcdr on Ret’d. List. Husband late Surg Lt Lillian Sugerman (see Starshell Fall 2013 obit) [AW, Globe & Mail]

- **CPO1 Leonard George FLANAGAN, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)
  82 in Perth, ON 02/11/13. Srv’d. Nootka, Huron, Quebec, Restigouche, Chaudière, Athabaskan, Cap de la Madeline and Bonaventure. [AW, Citizen]

- **CPO1 John GERVAIS, CD, RCN (Ret’d)**
  77 in Ottawa 01/11/13. Srv’d. in Quebec, Bonaventure, Nipigon and Ottawa. [Citizen]

- **Lt the Hon Louis Davies HYNDMAN, OC, QC, RCN(R) (Ret’d)**
  Former Edmonton Br., 78 in Edmonton 24/11/13. Jn’d. UNTD as Cdt at Nonsuch 01/52, prom. SLt 07/56 and Lt 05/58. Rls’d. in ‘62. Srv’d. as Hon Capt with 4th Destroyer Sqn. [WC]

- **Sug Capt(E) Robert Louis LANE, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)
  NAC Ottawa, 93 in Ottawa 27/12/13. RMC Cdt thence RCN Cdt 08/39 and to trg. RNC and RNEC. Prom. Mid(E) 05/40, fl’d. by HMS Glasgow. Prom. Slt(E) 01/42 and Lt(E) 03/43, thence Uganda 09/44, Niobe and Cayuga (Korea) 09/49. Prom. Lcdr(E) 03/51, fl’d. by Bytown 08/51 and Niobe 09/52. Prom. Cdr(E) 07/53, thence Bytown 12/54, Naden 10/58 and Bytown 07/60. Prom. Capt(E) 01/61, fl’d. by Catarqau (NDC) 09/65 and SACLANT. Ret’d. in ’69. Civ. career as management consultant. [Citizen]

- **Capt(E) Robert Louis McIVER, OMM, MID, OStJ, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)

- **Lcdr John McCammon REID, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)
  NSNOA, 91 in Bridgewater, NS 14/11/13. Jn’d. RCN in ‘41 and srv’d. Annapolis, Trillium and Waskesiu during WWII. Cdr’ed as Cdm Comman Off 04/63, thence Algonquin 12/54 and Shearwater 07/55. Prom. Lt 04/58, fl’d. by Patriot 05/58, Outremont 09/60 and Stadacona 03/63. Prom. Lcdr 10/63, fl’d. by CANMLREP NATO HQ and CFS Mill Cove (l/c). Ret’d. in ’71. Civ. career in real estate. [SR, Chronicle Herald]

- **Lcdr William Arthur SOMERVILLE (Ret’d)**
  NOAVI, 89 in Duncan, BC 28/09/13. WWII RCNVR service. Active with RCSC and Navy League in Winnipeg. Commanded RCSSC Qu’Appelle in the 1960s. [RT, GAM, Times Colonist]

- **Lt Robert France STAYSKO, RCN(R) (Ret’d)**
  Calgary Br., 88 in Calgary 21/11/13. Srv’d. RCAF WWII and postwar as Flt Lt in RCAF Auxiliary. Jn’d. Tecumseh 02/65 as Lt and srv’d. ‘til 1968. Civ. career in personnel side of the oil industry. [MB]
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LT(L) Irvine Newton JOHNSTON, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)
91 in Halifax 03/10/13. Jrn’d. RCN in WWII. CFR’d as Cmd ELEC Off 09/54 and prom. Lt(L) 01/59. Srv’d. New Liskeard, Iroquois, Magnificent, Bonaventure, Bytown and SUPLANT. Ret’d. in ’76. [SR, Chronicle Herald]

Lt(May)n Haydn KUZMINSKI, RCN(R) (Ret’d)
69 in Abbotsford, BC 14/11/13. Jrn’d. as UNTD Cdt at Unicorn in ’63, prom. SLt in ’66 and later Lt. Srv’d. Discovery and qual. as Ship’s Div Oflcer. [WC, Vancouver Sun]

Frances Jennifer LYNCH, QC
Former Ottawa Br., in Ottawa 13/11/13. Conflict management expert, charitable volunteer and Commissioner Canadian Human Rights Commission. [Citizen]

Chap CI III William Grant MacDONALD, RCN (Ret’d)
99 in Dartmouth, NS 06/12/13. Jrn’d 03/44 as Chap CI III, srv’d. Peregrine and rls’d. in ’46. [SR, Chronicle Herald]

Lcdr Francis Richard MATTHEWS, CM, QC, RCNVR (Ret’d)
93 in Calgary 02/10/13. Jrn’d. as Pay SLt 06/41 and prom. Pay Lt [Later Lt(S)] 09/41. Srv’d. Stadacona and Bytown. Rs’d. in ’45 and prom. Lcdr(S) on Ret’d. List. [AW, Globe & Mail]

Lcdr(L) Arlo Maitland MOEN, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)
93 in Halifax 28/10/13. Jrn’d. RCN in ’38, CFR’d as Cmd Rad Off 10/50, prom. Lt(L) 04/53 and Lcdr(L) 04/61. Srv’d. Stadacona, Quebec, Cayuga, Shelburne and SUPLANT. Ret’d. in ’70. [SR, Chronicle Herald]

Cdt(E) Geoffrey Frederick PENNEY, RCN (R)
74 in Burlington, ON 27/09/13, as Cdt(E) 01/58 at Cabot. [WC]

Lcdr(O)(P) Leslie Charles ROSENTHALL, CD*, RCN (Ret’d)
82 in Dartmouth, NS 08/13. Jrn’d. RCAF 07/42, rs’d. in ’48, thence RCAF (Reserve) in ’48. Tsf’d. to RCN 01/50 as SSA Lt(O) (sen. 06/49), qual. ‘P’ and permanent commission in ’56. Prom. Lcdr(O)(P) 06/57. Srv’d. Shearwater, Magnificent, Stadacona, RCAF for pilot trng., Bonaventure, Niagara (USN Aviation Safety Crs.) and Hochelaga. Ret’d. 04/70. Civilian career as public servant. [SR, Chronicle Herald]

CPO Thomas Anthony SAWYER, CD**, RCN (Ret’d)
87 in Oakville, ON 06/09/13. Srv’d Warrior, Cornwallis, Donnacona, Swansea, Sioux, La Hulloise, Stadacona, Granby, Magnificent, Prestonian, Nootka, New Waterford, Montcalm, Assiniboine, Discovery, HMS Dolphin, HMS/M’s Andrew, Alcide and Ojibwa. [JP]

SLt(NS) Mary Glen STIRLING (nee KEIRSTEAD), RCN
86 in Wolfville, NS 27/10/13. Jrn’d. in ’53, srv’d. in Stadacona and Cornwallis and rs’d. in ’55. [SR, Chronicle Herald]

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